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2 Predicting the socio-technical future (and other myths) 
Ben Anderson , Paul Stoneman  
 
A snooker ball model implies that simple, linear and predictable social change 
follows from the introduction of new technologies. Unfortunately technology 
does not have and has never had simple linear predictable social impacts. In 
this chapter we show that in most measurable ways, the pervasiveness of 
modern information and communication technologies has had little 
discernable ‘impact’ on most human behaviours of sociological significance. 
Historians of technology remind us that human society co-evolves with the 
technology it invents and that the eventual social and economic uses of a 
technology often turn out to be far removed from those originally envisioned. 
Rather than using the snooker ball model to attempt to predict future ICT 
usage and revenue models that are inevitably wrong, we suggest that truly 
participatory, grounded innovation, open systems and adaptive revenue 
models can lead us to a more effective, flexible and responsive innovation 
process. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Much human conduct is designed to avoid hazards and to promote beneficial returns. 
Indeed, this is the premise of the notion of ‘risk societies’ (Beck and Beck-
Gernsheim, 2002) where individuals rely on past and current information to determine 
their future, predominantly risk aversive, behaviours. This idiom of human affairs 
embraces most areas of life. Meteorologists can (sometimes) help us avoid bad 
weather; seismologists can warn of areas of pending earthquakes and volcanic 
eruptions; economists inform business and governments of forthcoming growth trends 
and market stability; political scientists tell us which party is most likely to form the 
next government and climatologists warn of the dire consequences of global warming. 
Of course the central tenet of forecasting and prediction is that by studying past 
information we can - with some ‘reasonable’ degree of accuracy - project what is 
likely to happen in the future. However, there is no such thing as an exact science, and 
the confidence with which we can predict the future depends on the phenomena in 
question, the information available and the granularity of prediction that we require.  
This chapter concerns itself with predicting the future ‘social implications’ of 
Information Communication Technologies (ICTs). It is sobering to remember that the 
telephone was not originally conceived as a means of human to human (or human to 
machine) communication. This form of usage evolved over time often in direct 
contradiction to notions of ‘proper use’ (Pool, 1983, Fischer, 1992). Despite this, it 
became the driving revenue stream for all telecommunications companies. Indeed, 
recent empirical studies of attempts at futurology have suggest that, amongst other 
problems, major reasons for failure have been an over-emphasis on technology 
determinism, a poor understanding of social trends and change, and finally, the over-
reliance on a linear progression model of change (Geels and Smit, 2000, Bouwman 
and Van Der Dun, 2007) 
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Here we examine long-term societal trends in behaviour using time use data from the 
1970s to the new millennium to show that in most measurable ways, the undoubted 
pervasiveness of modern information and communication technologies has had little 
discernable ‘impact’ on most human behaviours of sociological significance. We 
contrast this with observations from qualitative studies which illustrate how ICTs are 
changing the ways in which these behaviours are achieved; in other words, how ICTs 
are increasingly mediating (rather than impacting) everyday social practices. 
Historians of technology such as David E. Nye (Nye, 2006) remind us that human 
society co-evolves with the technology it invents and that the eventual social and 
economic uses of a technology very often turn out to be far removed from those 
originally envisioned. This position enables us to think more clearly about the ways in 
which people’s behaviours adapt to technologies and how supply and demand side 
interaction can lead to the co-adaptation of technologies. 
2.2 Implicit Predictions 
It is widely accepted that the natural world is governed by causal laws that provide a 
certain level of predictability for natural phenomena such as weather systems and 
animal behaviour (Hume, 1748, Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948). The social world, 
populated by slightly more anarchic humans, is less certain. This has led some critics 
to argue that attempts at predicting human behaviour may be fruitless (Hart et al., 
2007). However, despite huge problems predicting the future behaviour of 
individuals, it is possible to make reasonable predictions about groups of individuals 
(see for example (Clark, 2003). A Humean view of society suggests that much like 
natural phenomena, human thought and behaviour are also governed by hidden laws 
creating stable and repeated outcomes. On this reading, human behaviour is far from 
random; we can with the appropriate data describe similar patterns of thought and 
behaviour across individuals and, combined with the appropriate methods, explain at 
least in part why they think and act the way they do. 
Despite this, social scientists still see the primary role of theory as a way of providing 
explanations not predictions (Popper, 1959). But the move from explanation to 
prediction is only one short hop – it could be argued that every explanation 
necessarily contains within it a prediction. Let us take a pertinent example. Climate 
change has focused much attention on the atmospheric movements of greenhouse 
gases, notably CO2. An understanding of future emissions and movements helps us to 
predict the degree of hazard global warming (as a result of human activity) will pose 
on human populations.  
One way to gain perspective about the potential future trajectory for 
atmospheric CO2 is to examine the geologic record of its concentration in the 
past. How high has the CO2 concentration been in the past? How fast did it 
reach past high levels? (Shlesinger, 2003) 
Modelling the relationship between previous levels and previous global temperatures 
provides an insight into how future levels of CO2 emissions might impact global 
temperatures. Of course, the past and future impacts will never be the same – no two 
time periods will possess exactly the same conditions. But by making use of past 
information to make future projections we move out of the realm of explaining only, 
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and in terms of the future, out of the realm of guesswork and into the realm of 
forecasting and predicting. By doing so, futures become less uncertain. 
2.3 Socio-technical Futures 
The future of democratic societies are often couched in social-technical terms such as 
the creation of Information Societies (May, 2001) and e-Democracies (OECD, 2004). 
Such futures often imply radical transformations perhaps by creating new forms of 
civic engagement or by helping social life to flourish. The main reason that such 
radical changes can be hypothesised is the huge dispersion of ICTs in society. Indeed, 
the most prominent of all ICTs, the internet, can be thought of as the ‘new television’ 
in terms of uptake and usage. In 1950, only 10 percent of Americans had a television 
set; by 1959, this figure had soared to 90 percent, “probably the fastest diffusion of a 
major technological innovation ever recorded.” (Putnam, 1995). The internet 
demonstrates similar figures. For example, in the United Kingdom between 1999 and 
2005, the number of people (as a percentage of the adult population) who went online 
rose from 14 percent to 61 percent1. In the US, 69 percent of the adult population now 
have internet access2, compared to only 20 percent 6 years ago. 
Two schools of thought emerged for possible internet effects – the utopians (Baym, 
1997, Tarrow, 1999) and the dystopians (Nie and Hillygus, 2002). The first set of 
scholars believe that the Internet will restore a sense of community by providing a 
virtual meeting place for people with common interests (such as astronomy), which 
overcomes the limitations of space and time and where online communities could 
promote open, democratic discourse (Sproull and Kiesler, 1991), allow for multiple 
perspectives (Kapor, 1993), and even some political scientists believe it will help to 
mobilize collective action (Tarrow, 1999). Governments acknowledging the positive 
role of social capital and efficient information exchange have likewise posited the 
internet as a radical and positive driving force for democratic society: 
Broadband enabled communication, in combination with convergence, will 
bring social as well as economic benefits. It will contribute to e-inclusion, 
cohesion and cultural diversity. It offers the potential to improve and simplify 
the life of all Europeans and to change the way people interact, not just at 
work, but also with friends, family, community, and institutions… (CEC, 
2005) 
Other scholars express reservations, providing two responses to the previous 
arguments. First, not all uses of the Internet are social - the predominant activities are 
ones based around seeking information and engaging in solitary recreations (Nie and 
Erbring 2000). Second, many ‘social’ activities online (for example, email) are 
asynchronous; responses and feedback are delayed until the recipient signs on, reads 
the message, decides to answer, and the original sender eventually receives the 
answer. If this is being done instead of a phone call or perhaps even a face-to-face 
meeting, then such virtual communicating will give off the impression of maintaining 
the relationship, whilst in fact the quality of the relationship severely suffers (Gustein, 
                                                
1 http://www.statistics.gov.uk/CCI/nugget.asp?ID=8&Pos=6&ColRank=1&Rank=192 
2 http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats2.htm 
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1999). This is a way of saying that the Internet may be diverting people from ‘true’ 
community relations.  
The implications for internet based socio-technical futures on either reading are clear; 
either it will continue to facilitate the growth of social and civic society or it will 
undermine them. Both of these arguments represent a type of thinking characterised 
as the snooker ball model.   
2.4 The Snooker Ball Model 
The causal nature of this model is essentially Newtonian and characterised by two 
conditions. First, there is a clear observable effect between a causal (independent) 
variable and an outcome (dependent) variable. For example the presence or level of 
internet usage is an independent variable and social and civic participation is the 
dependent. Second, that this relationship is unconditional, that is, wherever the 
presence of the causal variable is found so too is the outcome variable (hence, a 
deterministic model). These clear and necessary impact effects are summarised in 
Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1: The Snooker Ball Model 
Here we can see how the model derives its name. Patterns of behaviour are happily 
meandering along until individuals begin to adopt ICT usage and then are suddenly 
cannoned off into a new direction creating a different outcome. As long as the ICT 
usage prevails, the effect will be sustained creating a new equilibrium outcome. 
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Figure 2: Observing the Snooker Ball Model 
Figure 2 demonstrates how in empirical terms we can observe the presence of such 
effects. Time runs along the X axis, while the vertical Y axis plots levels of a 
behavioural outcome, such as levels of social interactions.  Between time points 1 and 
3, social life exists without mass ICT usage. At time point 3, major ICT uptake begins 
so that by time point 9, a clear behavioural change can be observed. The three lines 
represent three different hypothetical scenarios. The blue line represents a lasting 
negative effect of ICT usage, the red line no effect at all, and the yellow line a 
positive effect.  
As long as time series data is available on both the important variables – ICT usage 
and behavioural outcomes – then it is possible to test which of the three hypothetical 
scenarios actually apply to the effects of recent ICT uptake and usage. It turns out that 
historical time-use data that is now becoming available suggests very little significant 
change in the major uses of time over the last 20 years as uptake and usage of the 
internet and mobile telephony has exploded in developed nations. Figure 3 below 
outlines data from time use diaries that demonstrate that the average time in each of 
four developed nations allocated to employment, social activities, watching TV and 
reading demonstrate little or no variation at all across time (see also Partridge 2007). 
 
To be published as: Anderson, B., & Stoneman, P. (2009). Predicting the socio-technical future (and other myths). In P. Warren 
& D. Brown (Eds.), ICT Futures: Trends in the use of Information and Communication Technologies. London: Wiley. 
© 2007, University of Essex Page 6 of 6 Last saved: 10/10/08 
  Employment 
  Social activities 
To be published as: Anderson, B., & Stoneman, P. (2009). Predicting the socio-technical future (and other myths). In P. Warren 
& D. Brown (Eds.), ICT Futures: Trends in the use of Information and Communication Technologies. London: Wiley. 
© 2007, University of Essex Page 7 of 7 Last saved: 10/10/08 
 Reading 
 TV watching 
Figure 3: Historical trends in time use (MTUS, Mean % of 24 hours for 
weekdays, all aged 20-59, error bars shown for UK only are +/- 95% CI) 
In other words, in most developed societies we see that shifts towards ‘e-Societies’ 
and the widespread ICT usage it brings does not translate into signs of significant 
social transformations despite the promulgations of various futurologists (Bell, 1973, 
Harvey, 1997, Castells, 2000). 
The data suggest therefore that a Newtonian/deterministic view of technology is not 
just simple but simplistic. So while Newtonian physics made way for quantum 
mechanics, the simple snooker ball model of socio-technical futures must likewise 
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give way to a more nuanced understanding of cause and effect between society and 
technology. 
2.5 The Conditional and Co-adaption Model 
If the past is prologue, then the preceding ten years suggest that not much will happen 
with socio-technical futures – at on level the everyday lives of citizens look very 
much the same now as they did 30 years ago. But is that the end of the story? There 
are two reasons to think not. The first reason is similar to the weakness of Newtonian 
physics. Once mainstream science began to reduce the world to a lower level of 
analysis (particles and sub-particles), it was clear a new way of thinking was required. 
Cue quantum mechanics. The second reason is an issue of time. While we cannot 
currently observe widespread positive or negative ICT effects, this might be because 
users haven’t yet fully adapted to the potential usages of such tools. 
Reducing socio-technical issues to a lower level of analysis requires a move away 
from whole population models and population averages. Specifically, this means 
rethinking the snooker ball model by abandoning the unconditional assumption 
described above. The world is just too messy for this to be the case. As soon as this 
condition is ditched, the idea of heterogeneity within a population and thus 
heterogeneity in responses to technological innovation becomes a primary empirical 
concern. Internet usage, for example, might facilitate further civic participation for 
some groups of people but not others. 
As an example, Figure 4 and Figure 5 present graphs of general election turnout by 
levels of internet usage (for political information) throughout the last British election 
campaign using the British Election Study 2005. In Figure 4 the sample population 
has been restricted to those individuals that express high levels of political interest 
and as we can see, for these people more or less internet usage for information seems 
to have no relationship with propensity to vote. The implication is that the strong level 
of political interest already found within the sample overrides any possible internet 
effects. 
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Figure 4: Vote turnout and Internet usage (all 
persons with high levels of political interest, British 
Election Survey 2005) 
 
Figure 5: Vote turnout and Internet usage (all those 
with no or little political interest, British Election 
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Survey 2005) 
Figure 5 however, paints a different picture. The working sample for this analysis was 
restricted to those that express none or low levels of political interest. As the figure 
demonstrates, for this group internet usage seems to boost turnout at higher levels. So 
by incorporating heterogeneity based on different levels of political interest into the 
analyses and moving away from ‘one model fits all’ type thinking, it is possible to 
demonstrate conditional positive internet effects. 
While belonging to a type of group can represent a conditional factor for internet 
effects, so too can the length of internet usage. The concern here is that relatively new 
users might not have had time to change their behaviour as a result of going online 
perhaps due to inexperience of the technology. Conversely, it might be the case that 
new users suffer from a ‘new toy’ effect so that the internet is used more than will be 
the case. Both scenarios demonstrate the importance of allowing users to settle on a 
normal pattern of usage before any judgements are made regarding its impact on 
behaviour. 
By making use of longitudinal time use diary data from the Home Online survey 
(Anderson and Tracey, 2001, Anderson, 2005), it is possible to demonstrate this 
because we have ‘before’ and ‘after’ measures of behaviour (cf Figure 2). Using 
multivariate regression analysis, it is possible to isolate whether more or less time 
spent on the internet correlates with more or less time spent socialising as well as a 
range of other variables (Stoneman, To Appear). The results show that in the first year 
of internet use, time spent surfing the internet has no significant correlation with time 
spent socialising. However further analyses demonstrate that for this data time spent 
web-browsing is mainly substituting time spent watching TV and doing nothing. 
Repeating the analysis for a longer time-frame (the first two years of internet use) on 
the other hand demonstrates small but significant and negative internet effects on time 
spent socialising. Although the effect of internet use on socialising is marginal (every 
extra hour spent online produces a net effect of 6 minutes less on social activities), the 
difference in the two sets of results demonstrate the importance of allowing users to 
settle upon a normal routine of usage before searching for possible effects. 
The implication of these analyses is that, far from having a direct impact on 
populations, technologies conditionally co-adapt with social life. Across time, 
individuals may or may not use innovations such as ICTs to support current 
behaviours and might even occasionally, once familiarity with the tool is established, 
create new patterns of behaviour. Socio-technical change is thus far from simple and 
as a corrective to the snooker ball model we must turn to a co-adaptation model. 
In this model we see that behaviours and usages are not straightforwardly predictable 
from the affordances of the ICTs as they depend on a range of contingent and 
contextual factors including lifestage, skills, needs and resources . Users may adapt 
their behaviour to make use of the affordances of the ICTs and in turn the ICT 
producers act on these new behaviours. Some behaviour may simply be a continuation 
of the past whilst others may be generally new or disruptive (Gower et al., 2001) in an 
ongoing process of domestication (Silverstone and Hirsch, 1992, Haddon, 2006). 
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2.6 Feedback Mechanisms and the Evolutionary Model  
The line of thinking behind the co-adaption model is now well established in social 
scientific studies of technology (Bijker et al., 1987, MacKenzie, 1998, Nye, 2006). By 
positing conditional effects, we begin to speak of probable causes and outcomes as 
opposed to the rather crude and simple ‘if A then B’ logic and we also begin to speak 
of iterative cycles of causal processes. But how far does the uncertainty principle go 
in the realm of socio-technical futures? If we observe a probable cause of an outcome 
now, how sure can we be this will occur again the future? 
A major problem is that the interactions between people, technologies and the 
producers of those technologies are rather more complex even than this. For one thing 
technologies have always generated unanticipated uses. This tradition of finding uses 
for technologies that their designers and marketers did not perceive still continues. 
This issue has been well known in the field of Computer Supported Co-operative 
Work (CSCW) for some years (Robinson, 1993) where it is common place for users 
of office systems to adapt them to their own purposes in ways that were not foreseen 
by the designers of the systems. Rather than viewing these new uses as ‘improper’ or 
‘user error’, CSCW sees in them an opportunity to capture users’ creativity and fold 
these uses back into the product or system. In other words, the users become the co-
designers of the system and the result is usually a workplace system that is far better 
suited to the work practices of those users and therefore far more likely to be used. 
We attempt to capture this complexity and reflexivity in terms of an evolutionary co-
adaptation model which is intentionally represented as complex and dynamic (Figure 
6). Here we can see the myriad of feedback loops that exist between behaviours 
directly and indirectly related to ICT usages and in turn the complex and iterative 
evolutionary relationship between these and the design and production of ICTs. In this 
model the term evolutionary comes to the fore as we suggest that usages (behaviours) 
and technologies are engaged in a form of evolutionary co-adaptation where changes 
on one ‘side’ are intimately related to changes on the other and can frequently lead to 
startling innovations (Krebs and Davies, 1997). 
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Figure 6: The evolutionary system model 
In the context of predicting future technology usages this model inevitably reduces 
our confidence in our ability to make sensible statements about what might happen 
and it is, in particular, the likelihood that unanticipated usages (and thus revenues) 
will come to the fore that drives this uncertainty. Who would have predicted that SMS 
would turn out to be used as a de facto means to keep in touch, to gift friendship, to 
dump boyfriends, to send intimate images, to organise protest or to look busy 
(Rheingold, 2002, Ling, 2004)? Or that Bluetooth mesaging would be used to gift 
pornography, to send threats, to project sexualities, and to hide identities (Bond, 
2007)? 
It seems plausible therefore that the diversity of users and usage contexts for 
malleable consumer technologies means that both of these may be unknowable at the 
time of conception and design. Thus perhaps the most fundamental challenge facing 
the design of products and services is that what a thing is for, and who its users will 
be, can rarely be defined in advance. This means that any approach to the design of 
artefacts that assumes that the confident definition of user, task and goal is possible 
will be of limited use (Lacohee and Anderson, 2001). 
2.7 Implications for forward thinking 
The crucial aspect captured by an evolutionary understanding of socio-technical 
futures is the importance of a feedback mechanism between innovators and users. The 
implication is that innovators perhaps need to innovate less and listen and observe 
more whilst placing more control over product development in the hands of 
customers. Whilst most commercial organisations would see this as deeply 
threatening, new models of customer-led innovation and indeed customer-generated 
innovation are showing how these phenomena can be turned to profit. Such models 
can provide essentially free research and development (the customers do it 
themselves), will construct services ‘developers’ would never have dreamed of, will 
meet customers’ own heterogeneous needs and can generate unanticipated revenues. 
These models acknowledge that many people like to consume, many like to customise 
and more than are commonly supposed will seek to construct products and services 
for themselves (Oudshoorn and Pinch, 2003). Drawing on a range of empirical studies 
Eric von Hippel for example estimates that up to 40 percent of users actively develop 
or modify products (von Hippel, 1986). First mooted under the rubric of mass 
customisation (Davis, 1987) and more recently observed and advocated again by von 
Hippel (2005) amongst others, the model involves the potential users/customers in a 
rapid cycle of design, use and re-design – betaworld. 
To give one excellent example, a recent study of the creation of a teen-oriented 
website recorded the rapid transition of the site from an ‘Editors know best: we create, 
you use” model to a “They know best, we supply the framework, they do the content 
model” (Neff and Stark, 2004). Indeed the executive interviewed said 
“We don’t have people sitting around thinking. ‘What do teens want?’ It 
doesn’t work. Even if you could figure it out, it wouldn’t last. You can try to 
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write for them but it doesn’t work. Now 95% of our content is written by teens 
themselves.” (Neff and Stark, 2004) 
This model can now be seen at work in a plethora of internet-based services which 
implicitly or explicitly support users in the creation of their own content (blogs, wikis, 
flickr, facebook, youtube et al) and their own applications and services (google, 
facebook, ning). It is a model radically different from the traditional ‘innovate, design, 
build, launch, market, sell, wait for revenue’ pipeline model because it allows the 
business case/model to evolve during development, and thus respond to unanticipated 
use, rather than being (usually) incorrectly specified in advance. It may be that such 
adaptive revenue models are one part of a response to the problem of responding to 
disruptive technologies. If uses and thus revenues cannot be predicted in advance then 
at least we can put in place adaptive organisational mechanisms so that emerging uses 
and revenues can be exploited rapidly. This requires commercial organisations to 
admit both institutionally and emotionally that they are no longer in control of their 
product and service lines.  
This then is our partial answer to the problem posed in the introduction. Rather than 
persisting in attempting to predict future ICT usage and revenue models and thus 
producing future visions and business cases that turn out to be wrong, we suggest that 
truly participatory designs (Bjerknes et al., 1987), grounded innovation (Anderson et 
al., 2002), open systems and adaptive revenue models can lead us to a more effective, 
flexible and responsive innovation process. On current trajectories it will certainly 
provide us with an explosion in novel tools with which to live our lives. In terms of 
who uses what for which purpose, this does not make socio-technical futures more 
certain. It does, however, acknowledge that socio-technical futures now passed were 
never certain, and there is no reason to believe current futures will be any different. 
Nonetheless, our answer is not simply que sera sera. By working with uncertainty as 
opposed to projecting regardless of it, one thing will become more certain – a more 
user informed innovation process leading to significantly improved business models. 
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